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Christopher Yeomans

Thomas Reid and Some Regress Arguments

This paper reconstructs Reid's responses to regress arguments against the possibility of free will, highlighting the role played by long-term decisions (“general fixed purposes”) in the explanation of paradigmatic free actions on Reid's account. In addition to reconstructing Reid's response to the two versions of the regress argument that he explicitly discusses, I also construct a Reidian response to Galen Strawson's contemporary version of the regress argument. The depth of Reid's position is most apparent in the resources it provides for responding to this sophisticated articulation of a traditional argument against freedom of the will.

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Walter de Gruyter

Print ISSN: 0003-9101
Volume: 88, 03/2006
Pages: 54 - 81

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