Rachana Kamtekar
Plato on the Attribution of Conative Attitudes
Plato's Socrates famously claims that we want (β&ogr;&uacgr;λϵσθαı) rather than what we think good (Gorgias 468bd); he also claims that we desire (?πıθυμϵĩν) things that we think are good, which are sometimes in fact bad (Meno 77de). Drawing on similarities between Plato's treatment of conative and cognitive attitudes, this paper shows how Plato's various accounts of the relationship between our conative attitudes and the good account for the norm-responsiveness of our conative attitudes.
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Walter de Gruyter
Print ISSN: 0003-9101
Volume: 88, 07/2006
Pages: 127 - 162
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