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Gustavo Sarmiento

On Kant’s definition of the monad in the Monadologia physica of 1756

It is well known that the modern atomists assumed the ancient thesis that things are composed of simple entities. It is also known that Leibniz went beyond atomism, since he affirmed that the true substances on which things are founded, the so-called monads, cannot be divisible or extended, for they are souls. For Christian Wolff, the elements of bodies are not extended; these elements have no figure and no magnitude whatsoever, they fill no space and are indivisible. In the Monadologia physica, published in 1756, Kant also argues that the ultimate principles of bodies are the monads or simple substances. The goal of this work is to reconcile the confronted positions of “metaphysics” and “geometry”.

Kant-Studien, Walter de Gruyter

Print ISSN: 0022-8877
Volume: 96, 03/2005
Pages: 1 - 19

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