Hermann Graml has heavily criticized the results of Johannes Hürter′s and Felix Römer′s research in the context of the discussion on the role the future conspirators played within the command of Heeresgruppe Mitte (army group) during the first phase of the German war of extermination against the Soviet Union, and on their path into resistance. Hürter and Römer refute Graml′s criticism. They question his understanding of historiography as an instrument of politics, and they criticize the fact that his preference is for retrospective sources rather than for contemporary records. Hürter and Römer also correct the impressionist pictures Graml uses to play down the war on the eastern front, and they disprove his assertion that the German leaders had not had a concept for a blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union. The radical German policy of occupation in the conquered Soviet territories was closely intertwined with the concept for a blitzkrieg. Hürter and Römer prove that one of the German basic decree (the so-called Kriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlass) was accepted as the basis of the German policy of occupation even in the command of Heeresgruppe Mitte, a fact that Graml denies in his contribution. Last but not least the core issues of the debate are dealt with: the fact that the command of Heeresgruppe Mitte cooperated with the squad of Einsatzgruppe B and that they tolerated the initially selective shootings that were carried out by the Einsatzgruppe in the first weeks of the campaign, as well as the complexity of the conspirators′ motives which were made up both of moral and of professional military considerations, and which led them only gradually to their decision to strive for a coup d′état.
Print ISSN: 0042-5702
Volume: 54, 02/2006
Pages: 301 - 322