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Matthias Uhl, Armin Wagner
“The Possibilites, but also the Limits of Intelligence Service Reconnaissance in Especially Comprehensible Manner”
Keywords: Berliner Mauer, Bundesnachrichtendienst
“In the Summer of sixty-one, on the 13th of August, we closed the border and nobody saw us”, was the rhyme in an East German propaganda song after the construction of the Berlin Wall. But did the western intelligence services really have no clues as to the Eastern preparations for the closure of the border? Documents now accessible in the Federal Archives in Koblenz do not confirm this assessment. As early as the end of July, 1961, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) indicated to the Federal Government in one of its routine monthly reports that the possibility of an “effective blockade” of West Berlin by the GDR had to be considered. While politicians in West Berlin and Bonn deemed diverse reactions by the East as possible, in the view of the Bundesnachrichtendienst, more signs were pointing to the forceful barring of the sector boundary than towards any other course of action during the weeks and days before and during the construction of the Berlin Wall. This is precisely what the BND assessment reported to the political leadership of the Federal Republic.
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag
Print ISSN: 0042-5702
Volume: 55, 04/2007
Pages: 681 - 725